DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY
A formal economic analysis of the discarding problem is presented, focusing on the individual fisherman and the effect of different regulations on the fisherman's incentives to discard. It is shown that in a nonregulated fishery, either multispecies or single species/multisize, where the only c...
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ftagecon:oai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:28130 2023-05-15T16:27:41+02:00 DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY Vestergaard, Niels 1996 20 application/pdf http://purl.umn.edu/28130 English en eng AgEcon Search Marine Resource Economics>Volume 11, Number 4, 1996 14896 http://purl.umn.edu/28130 Resource /Energy Economics and Policy Journal Article 1996 ftagecon 2012-09-12T16:24:39Z A formal economic analysis of the discarding problem is presented, focusing on the individual fisherman and the effect of different regulations on the fisherman's incentives to discard. It is shown that in a nonregulated fishery, either multispecies or single species/multisize, where the only constraints are the hold capacity and the length of the season, the fisherman may have rational incentives to discard/highgrade, if the marginal trip profit of an extra fishing day is greater than the average trip profit. Regulation by TAC does not change the incentives to discard. However, under INTQs and ITOs, the incentives to discard increase. The incentives to discard decrease under ITQs compared to INTQs, if the unit quota price is smaller than the shadow price of the quota. The model is applied to the Greenland shrimp fishery, where it demonstrates the reported discard behavior in the fishery. Finally, different regulations of discard are applied and discussed in the model. The analysis suggests that regulation of fishing days could be a promising alternative to usual suggested measures like tax/subsidies and landings obligations. Article in Journal/Newspaper Greenland AgEcon Search - Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics Greenland Tac ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500) |
institution |
Open Polar |
collection |
AgEcon Search - Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics |
op_collection_id |
ftagecon |
language |
English |
topic |
Resource /Energy Economics and Policy |
spellingShingle |
Resource /Energy Economics and Policy Vestergaard, Niels DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY |
topic_facet |
Resource /Energy Economics and Policy |
description |
A formal economic analysis of the discarding problem is presented, focusing on the individual fisherman and the effect of different regulations on the fisherman's incentives to discard. It is shown that in a nonregulated fishery, either multispecies or single species/multisize, where the only constraints are the hold capacity and the length of the season, the fisherman may have rational incentives to discard/highgrade, if the marginal trip profit of an extra fishing day is greater than the average trip profit. Regulation by TAC does not change the incentives to discard. However, under INTQs and ITOs, the incentives to discard increase. The incentives to discard decrease under ITQs compared to INTQs, if the unit quota price is smaller than the shadow price of the quota. The model is applied to the Greenland shrimp fishery, where it demonstrates the reported discard behavior in the fishery. Finally, different regulations of discard are applied and discussed in the model. The analysis suggests that regulation of fishing days could be a promising alternative to usual suggested measures like tax/subsidies and landings obligations. |
format |
Article in Journal/Newspaper |
author |
Vestergaard, Niels |
author_facet |
Vestergaard, Niels |
author_sort |
Vestergaard, Niels |
title |
DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY |
title_short |
DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY |
title_full |
DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY |
title_fullStr |
DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY |
title_full_unstemmed |
DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY |
title_sort |
discard behavior, highgrading and regulation: the case of the greenland shrimp fishery |
publisher |
AgEcon Search |
publishDate |
1996 |
url |
http://purl.umn.edu/28130 |
long_lat |
ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500) |
geographic |
Greenland Tac |
geographic_facet |
Greenland Tac |
genre |
Greenland |
genre_facet |
Greenland |
op_relation |
Marine Resource Economics>Volume 11, Number 4, 1996 14896 http://purl.umn.edu/28130 |
_version_ |
1766017135082995712 |