DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY

A formal economic analysis of the discarding problem is presented, focusing on the individual fisherman and the effect of different regulations on the fisherman's incentives to discard. It is shown that in a nonregulated fishery, either multispecies or single species/multisize, where the only c...

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Main Author: Vestergaard, Niels
Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
Language:English
Published: AgEcon Search 1996
Subjects:
Tac
Online Access:http://purl.umn.edu/28130
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spelling ftagecon:oai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:28130 2023-05-15T16:27:41+02:00 DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY Vestergaard, Niels 1996 20 application/pdf http://purl.umn.edu/28130 English en eng AgEcon Search Marine Resource Economics>Volume 11, Number 4, 1996 14896 http://purl.umn.edu/28130 Resource /Energy Economics and Policy Journal Article 1996 ftagecon 2012-09-12T16:24:39Z A formal economic analysis of the discarding problem is presented, focusing on the individual fisherman and the effect of different regulations on the fisherman's incentives to discard. It is shown that in a nonregulated fishery, either multispecies or single species/multisize, where the only constraints are the hold capacity and the length of the season, the fisherman may have rational incentives to discard/highgrade, if the marginal trip profit of an extra fishing day is greater than the average trip profit. Regulation by TAC does not change the incentives to discard. However, under INTQs and ITOs, the incentives to discard increase. The incentives to discard decrease under ITQs compared to INTQs, if the unit quota price is smaller than the shadow price of the quota. The model is applied to the Greenland shrimp fishery, where it demonstrates the reported discard behavior in the fishery. Finally, different regulations of discard are applied and discussed in the model. The analysis suggests that regulation of fishing days could be a promising alternative to usual suggested measures like tax/subsidies and landings obligations. Article in Journal/Newspaper Greenland AgEcon Search - Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics Greenland Tac ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500)
institution Open Polar
collection AgEcon Search - Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics
op_collection_id ftagecon
language English
topic Resource /Energy Economics and Policy
spellingShingle Resource /Energy Economics and Policy
Vestergaard, Niels
DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY
topic_facet Resource /Energy Economics and Policy
description A formal economic analysis of the discarding problem is presented, focusing on the individual fisherman and the effect of different regulations on the fisherman's incentives to discard. It is shown that in a nonregulated fishery, either multispecies or single species/multisize, where the only constraints are the hold capacity and the length of the season, the fisherman may have rational incentives to discard/highgrade, if the marginal trip profit of an extra fishing day is greater than the average trip profit. Regulation by TAC does not change the incentives to discard. However, under INTQs and ITOs, the incentives to discard increase. The incentives to discard decrease under ITQs compared to INTQs, if the unit quota price is smaller than the shadow price of the quota. The model is applied to the Greenland shrimp fishery, where it demonstrates the reported discard behavior in the fishery. Finally, different regulations of discard are applied and discussed in the model. The analysis suggests that regulation of fishing days could be a promising alternative to usual suggested measures like tax/subsidies and landings obligations.
format Article in Journal/Newspaper
author Vestergaard, Niels
author_facet Vestergaard, Niels
author_sort Vestergaard, Niels
title DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY
title_short DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY
title_full DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY
title_fullStr DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY
title_full_unstemmed DISCARD BEHAVIOR, HIGHGRADING AND REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE GREENLAND SHRIMP FISHERY
title_sort discard behavior, highgrading and regulation: the case of the greenland shrimp fishery
publisher AgEcon Search
publishDate 1996
url http://purl.umn.edu/28130
long_lat ENVELOPE(-59.517,-59.517,-62.500,-62.500)
geographic Greenland
Tac
geographic_facet Greenland
Tac
genre Greenland
genre_facet Greenland
op_relation Marine Resource Economics>Volume 11, Number 4, 1996
14896
http://purl.umn.edu/28130
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