Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered
Abstract This article examines theories of ocean rights based on the works of Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. Grotius's object‐centred view uses features of the natural world to justify claims to external objects. I show that Grotius's view is inadequate, because it relies on an out...
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crwiley:10.1111/japp.12340 2024-09-15T18:26:27+00:00 Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered Nine, Cara 2018 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/japp.12340 https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fjapp.12340 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/japp.12340 en eng Wiley http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor Journal of Applied Philosophy volume 36, issue 4, page 626-642 ISSN 0264-3758 1468-5930 journal-article 2018 crwiley https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12340 2024-08-09T04:26:57Z Abstract This article examines theories of ocean rights based on the works of Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. Grotius's object‐centred view uses features of the natural world to justify claims to external objects. I show that Grotius's view is inadequate, because it relies on an outdated claim that oceanic resources are sufficiently abundant for anybody to use. Further, adaptations of his view are wanting, because they either rely on arbitrary distinctions or disregard the values of cultural minorities. Pufendorf's relational view constructs rights through the exercise of human will. While Pufendorf believes that agreements create rights, he also argues that property rights can be unilaterally acquired from the commons without express consent from others. The relational view is a viable alternative to the object‐centred view, because it both delimits territorial claims over the ocean to a ‘modest’ size and also respects cultural variability. A major aim of this article is to present Pufendorf's theory of territorial rights extended over oceans and to demonstrate how it is useful for assessing contemporary disputes. In the final sections, I apply the relational view to Canadian claims to the Northwest Passage, and I also sketch implications for assessing expanding claims to the seabed. Article in Journal/Newspaper Northwest passage Wiley Online Library Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 4 626 642 |
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English |
description |
Abstract This article examines theories of ocean rights based on the works of Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf. Grotius's object‐centred view uses features of the natural world to justify claims to external objects. I show that Grotius's view is inadequate, because it relies on an outdated claim that oceanic resources are sufficiently abundant for anybody to use. Further, adaptations of his view are wanting, because they either rely on arbitrary distinctions or disregard the values of cultural minorities. Pufendorf's relational view constructs rights through the exercise of human will. While Pufendorf believes that agreements create rights, he also argues that property rights can be unilaterally acquired from the commons without express consent from others. The relational view is a viable alternative to the object‐centred view, because it both delimits territorial claims over the ocean to a ‘modest’ size and also respects cultural variability. A major aim of this article is to present Pufendorf's theory of territorial rights extended over oceans and to demonstrate how it is useful for assessing contemporary disputes. In the final sections, I apply the relational view to Canadian claims to the Northwest Passage, and I also sketch implications for assessing expanding claims to the seabed. |
format |
Article in Journal/Newspaper |
author |
Nine, Cara |
spellingShingle |
Nine, Cara Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered |
author_facet |
Nine, Cara |
author_sort |
Nine, Cara |
title |
Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered |
title_short |
Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered |
title_full |
Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered |
title_fullStr |
Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered |
title_full_unstemmed |
Rights to the Oceans: Foundational Arguments Reconsidered |
title_sort |
rights to the oceans: foundational arguments reconsidered |
publisher |
Wiley |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/japp.12340 https://api.wiley.com/onlinelibrary/tdm/v1/articles/10.1111%2Fjapp.12340 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/japp.12340 |
genre |
Northwest passage |
genre_facet |
Northwest passage |
op_source |
Journal of Applied Philosophy volume 36, issue 4, page 626-642 ISSN 0264-3758 1468-5930 |
op_rights |
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor |
op_doi |
https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12340 |
container_title |
Journal of Applied Philosophy |
container_volume |
36 |
container_issue |
4 |
container_start_page |
626 |
op_container_end_page |
642 |
_version_ |
1810466934606528512 |