Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries
Garrett Hardin's “tragedy of the commons” metaphor is commonly invoked to account for the unfortunate state of world fisheries. But the world s oceans are no longer a global commons and have not been so for the past two decades. Open-access regimes have persisted within many exclusive economic...
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crjohnshopkinsun:10.1353/wp.2002.0011 2024-04-07T07:53:31+00:00 Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries Alcock, Frank 2002 http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0011 https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100016749 en eng Project MUSE https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms World Politics volume 54, issue 4, page 437-461 ISSN 0043-8871 1086-3338 Political Science and International Relations Sociology and Political Science journal-article 2002 crjohnshopkinsun https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0011 2024-03-08T02:46:16Z Garrett Hardin's “tragedy of the commons” metaphor is commonly invoked to account for the unfortunate state of world fisheries. But the world s oceans are no longer a global commons and have not been so for the past two decades. Open-access regimes have persisted within many exclusive economic zones (EEZs) during this time, but coastal states' authority to regulate domestic fisheries has existed for more than a generation. Faced with the prospect of Hardin's tragedy, coastal states have had more than twenty years to devise institutional constraints that would prevent it. This article asserts that the dismal experience with EEZs is in large part attributable to distributive bargaining problems that arose within coastal states in the wake of EEZ extension. Moreover, the article argues that high levels of uncertainty that characterize the early stages of institutional development have exacerbated these problems. Finally, the article demonstrates how the variety of institutional designs and paths of institutional development that are observed in the cases of Iceland, Norway, and Atlantic Canada result from the different configurations of political power and political structure within each case. While the empirical discussion is focused upon property rights and fisheries, the theoretical discussion of bargaining and uncertainty has widespread application across comparative and international politics. Article in Journal/Newspaper Iceland Johns Hopkins University Press Canada Norway World Politics 54 4 437 461 |
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Open Polar |
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Johns Hopkins University Press |
op_collection_id |
crjohnshopkinsun |
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English |
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Political Science and International Relations Sociology and Political Science |
spellingShingle |
Political Science and International Relations Sociology and Political Science Alcock, Frank Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries |
topic_facet |
Political Science and International Relations Sociology and Political Science |
description |
Garrett Hardin's “tragedy of the commons” metaphor is commonly invoked to account for the unfortunate state of world fisheries. But the world s oceans are no longer a global commons and have not been so for the past two decades. Open-access regimes have persisted within many exclusive economic zones (EEZs) during this time, but coastal states' authority to regulate domestic fisheries has existed for more than a generation. Faced with the prospect of Hardin's tragedy, coastal states have had more than twenty years to devise institutional constraints that would prevent it. This article asserts that the dismal experience with EEZs is in large part attributable to distributive bargaining problems that arose within coastal states in the wake of EEZ extension. Moreover, the article argues that high levels of uncertainty that characterize the early stages of institutional development have exacerbated these problems. Finally, the article demonstrates how the variety of institutional designs and paths of institutional development that are observed in the cases of Iceland, Norway, and Atlantic Canada result from the different configurations of political power and political structure within each case. While the empirical discussion is focused upon property rights and fisheries, the theoretical discussion of bargaining and uncertainty has widespread application across comparative and international politics. |
format |
Article in Journal/Newspaper |
author |
Alcock, Frank |
author_facet |
Alcock, Frank |
author_sort |
Alcock, Frank |
title |
Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries |
title_short |
Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries |
title_full |
Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries |
title_fullStr |
Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries |
title_full_unstemmed |
Bargaining, Uncertainty, and Property Rights in Fisheries |
title_sort |
bargaining, uncertainty, and property rights in fisheries |
publisher |
Project MUSE |
publishDate |
2002 |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0011 https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100016749 |
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Canada Norway |
geographic_facet |
Canada Norway |
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Iceland |
genre_facet |
Iceland |
op_source |
World Politics volume 54, issue 4, page 437-461 ISSN 0043-8871 1086-3338 |
op_rights |
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms |
op_doi |
https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0011 |
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World Politics |
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54 |
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4 |
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437 |
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461 |
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1795669468254306304 |