Cooperative action between fishermen and inspectors in the Svalbard Zone

• Published in: Polar Record
• Main Author: Hønneland, Geir
• Format: Article in Journal/Newspaper
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge University Press (CUP) 1999
• Subjects: General Earth and Planetary Sciences; Ecology; Geography, Planning and Development; Arctic; Arctic Ocean; Svalbard; Polar Record
• Online Access: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0032247400015497; https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0032247400015497

Abstract This article demonstrates that, similar to the many cases of self-regulation of local commons, it is in certain conditions also possible to manage an international ocean-fishery without the use of direct coercion. The case study from the Svalbard Zone supports the argument of cooperative action theory: that a limited number of participants, rules at least partly designed by the users themselves, and a system of graduated punishment contribute to compliance with established rules. Based on observational data as well as in-depth interviews with Norwegian and Russian fishermen in the area, it seems particularly fruitful to conceive of the Norwegian Coast Guard not only as a state enforcement body in the Svalbard Zone, but its representatives also as constituent parts of a social system, a ‘seafaring community,’ in the area. When, due to jurisdictional dispute, it has been impossible to rely fully on external regulation in the area, the Coast Guard has taken upon itself the role of the mediator, admittedly representing state interests, but nevertheless aimed at achieving consensus with the fishing fleet on important regulation issues. Hence, the internal authority of this Arctic Ocean fisheries lies above all in the interface between fishermen's and inspector's arguments, and in the social relations accompanying the exchange of professional opinions.